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A Novel Random Forest Framework For Behavioral Classification Of Evolving Malware Variants

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Abstract*—Polymorphic and metamorphic malware has rendered conventional signature-based antivirus mechanisms increasingly ineffective, necessitating the development of adaptive, behavior-centric detection paradigms. This paper presents a Novel Random Forest Framework for Behavioral Classification of Evolving Malware Variants, evaluated against the Polymorphic Malware Dataset (2025), a comprehensive corpus of 15,800 labeled behavioral execution traces spanning six malware families and benign software. The proposed framework leverages an ensemble of 500 decision trees trained on twelve engineered behavioral features — including API call frequency index, system call entropy, registry write frequency, and network packet burst rate — to capture invariant behavioral signatures that persist across polymorphic code mutations. The framework achieves a classification accuracy of 97.32%, F1-score of 96.89%, and AUC-ROC of 0.973, outperforming five baseline models including Support Vector Machine (91.47%), Neural Network (89.63%), K-Nearest Neighbors (85.21%), Logistic Regression (82.14%), and Decision Tree (79.08%) by margins of 5.85 to 18.24 percentage points in accuracy. Feature importance analysis confirms that behavioral execution features — particularly API call frequency and system call entropy — provide discriminative power that is invariant to syntactic code obfuscation. Confusion matrix analysis demonstrates a macro-averaged false positive rate of 2.68%, demonstrating operational suitability for real-time cybersecurity deployment. The proposed framework establishes Random Forest as a superior, interpretable, and scalable approach for detecting evolving malware variants in enterprise endpoint security environments.

Keywords—malware detection, random forest, polymorphic malware, behavioral analysis, machine learning, cybersecurity, feature importance, Polymorphic Malware Dataset 2025.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background and Motivation

The global cybersecurity landscape has been fundamentally reshaped by the evolution of polymorphic and metamorphic malware, whose defining characteristic is the continuous self-modification of code signatures while preserving functional malicious behavior. Polymorphic malware employs encryption engines and variable decryptors to generate syntactically distinct code variants with each propagation cycle, rendering static pattern matching against known virus signatures fundamentally ineffective [1]. Metamorphic variants adopt more aggressive self-rewriting strategies including code transposition, instruction substitution, and dead-code insertion, producing functionally equivalent but structurally dissimilar executables that evade both signature databases and heuristic pattern detectors [2].

Traditional antivirus engines depend on hash-based signature matching and static disassembly heuristics that are inherently brittle against polymorphic transformations. When a malware binary mutates, its hash signature changes immediately, invalidating database entries until a new signature is manually curated and distributed — a process that introduces detection lag measured in hours to days

during which undetected variants propagate freely across enterprise networks [3]. The 2025 threat intelligence landscape reports that over 450,000 unique malware samples are registered daily, with polymorphic variants constituting approximately 93% of all observed malware detections [4], underscoring the urgent need for detection methodologies that operate on behavioral semantics rather than syntactic signatures.

Behavioral analysis approaches offer a promising alternative by monitoring the dynamic execution characteristics of programs — including system calls, API invocations, file system modifications, registry operations, and network communications — which remain functionally stable across syntactic mutations. The central hypothesis of this work is that an ensemble classifier trained on behavioral execution features will demonstrate robust detection performance against polymorphic malware families that defeat signature-based systems [5].

B. Problem Statement

Three critical challenges complicate the deployment of machine learning-based malware detection in practice. First, the high variability of behavioral traces across polymorphic variants of the same malware family produces intra-class feature distributions with substantial overlap, requiring classifiers capable of learning robust decision boundaries from noisy, high-dimensional feature spaces [6]. Second, the class imbalance inherent in real-world malware corpora — where benign samples may outnumber specific malware families by orders of magnitude — biases naive classifiers toward the majority class, inflating overall accuracy while producing unacceptably high false negative rates for minority malware families [7]. Third, the interpretability requirement of enterprise security operations mandates that detection models provide actionable forensic evidence beyond binary classification outputs, enabling security analysts to understand which behavioral signatures triggered a detection event [8].

C. Research Objectives

This research addresses the above challenges through three primary objectives:

i. Develop a behavioral feature engineering pipeline for polymorphic-resistant malware classification, focusing on execution-layer features that remain invariant across syntactic code mutations.

ii. Design and implement a Random Forest ensemble classification framework optimized for high-dimensional, imbalanced behavioral malware datasets with interpretable feature importance outputs.

iii. Conduct comprehensive comparative evaluation against five baseline models across six malware families using the Polymorphic Malware Dataset (2025), establishing statistical significance of performance improvements.

D. Contributions

The primary contribution of this study involves the development of twelve invariant execution-layer features engineered for resilience against polymorphic mutation. Performance is optimized through a Bayesian-tuned Random Forest framework incorporating class-weight balancing and out-of-bag validation, which yields significant gains in detection accuracy. Experimental results establish that this model outperforms five baseline classifiers across all metrics, with ablation studies further validating the necessity of the proposed feature set. Moreover, the inclusion of a feature importance ranking facilitates forensic interpretability, allowing analysts to identify the specific behavioral signatures most indicative of malicious activity.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews related work. Section III describes the dataset and preprocessing. Section IV details the methodology. Section V provides core justification for the Random Forest approach. Section VI presents the experimental setup. Section VII reports results. Sections VIII and IX discuss findings and conclude the paper.

II. RELATED WORK

A. Traditional Malware Detection

Early malware detection systems relied exclusively on static signature databases maintained by antivirus vendors. Szor [9] provided a foundational treatment of virus detection mechanisms, documenting the systematic arms race between signature generation and polymorphic evasion techniques. Heuristic extensions to signature scanning, including control flow graph analysis, n-gram byte sequence matching, and import address table inspection, improved detection coverage at the cost of elevated false positive rates and susceptibility to targeted obfuscation attacks [10]. YARA rule-based detection introduced a more expressive pattern language for malware characterization [11], yet remains fundamentally constrained by the requirement for prior knowledge of the target malware's structural characteristics.

B. Machine Learning Approaches

Machine learning approaches to malware detection gained traction following seminal work demonstrating the viability of statistical feature extraction from static binary analysis. Schultz et al. [12] pioneered the application of decision trees and Naive Bayes classifiers to malware detection using byte sequence features, establishing the feasibility of automated classification from binary representations. Subsequent work by Kolter and Maloof [13] applied n-gram frequency analysis with boosted decision stumps, reporting detection accuracies exceeding 98% on static malware corpora. Support Vector Machines with radial basis function kernels demonstrated strong performance on n-gram feature vectors but exhibited

scalability limitations with increasing binary corpus sizes [14].

Deep learning approaches including Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) applied to binary visualization [15] and Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) for API call sequence modeling [16] achieved high accuracy on static benchmarks but demonstrated significant performance degradation against polymorphic variants due to overfit to syntactic code patterns. The requirement for large labeled training corpora further limits practical deployment of deep learning detectors in zero-day and polymorphic threat scenarios [17].

C. Behavioral Analysis Techniques

Dynamic behavioral analysis circumvents the fundamental limitation of static approaches by observing program execution rather than inspecting code. API call sequence analysis, pioneered by Forrest et al. [18] in the context of intrusion detection, was subsequently applied to malware classification by Rieck et al. [19], who demonstrated that n-gram representations of system call sequences enabled effective malware family classification using SVM classifiers. Network behavioral analysis, including DNS query pattern analysis and command-and-control traffic characterization, provides complementary detection signals for malware families with network-dependent operational phases [20].

Sandbox-based behavioral analysis platforms including Cuckoo Sandbox [21] and Any.Run automate the collection of behavioral execution traces under controlled dynamic analysis conditions, producing structured logs of API calls, file system operations, registry modifications, and network communications that form the raw substrate for behavioral machine learning classifiers. The Polymorphic Malware Dataset (2025) employed in this work represents a curated collection of such sandbox-generated behavioral traces [22].

D. Research Gaps

Despite substantial progress, three gaps persist in the literature. First, the majority of evaluated datasets consist of statically collected binary corpora rather than behavioral execution traces, limiting applicability to polymorphic variants that defeat static analysis [6]. Second, comparative evaluations rarely include comprehensive hyperparameter optimization for all baseline models, potentially understating baseline performance and inflating apparent gains of proposed methods [23]. Third, few studies provide systematic feature importance analysis that enables forensic interpretability of detection decisions, limiting operational adoption in security operations center (SOC) environments where analyst accountability is required [8]. This paper addresses all three gaps through behavioral feature focus, rigorous hyperparameter tuning of all compared models, and comprehensive feature importance reporting.

III. DATASET DESCRIPTION

A. Polymorphic Malware Dataset (2025)

The Polymorphic Malware Dataset (2025) is a contemporary benchmark corpus specifically designed to evaluate behavioral malware detection methods against polymorphic code evolution [22]. The dataset comprises 15,800 labeled execution trace records collected from controlled dynamic analysis of malware samples spanning six distinct malware families and a benign software category. Malware samples were executed in isolated sandboxed environments (Windows 10 64-bit, 8GB RAM) instrumented for comprehensive behavioral monitoring over 300-second execution windows. The dataset composition is as follows: Ransomware (2,650 samples), Trojan (2,580 samples), Worm (2,490 samples), Rootkit (2,420 samples), Spyware (2,470 samples), and Benign software (3,190 samples), yielding a mild imbalance ratio of approximately 1.3:1 between the largest and smallest classes.

A defining characteristic of the dataset is its explicit inclusion of polymorphic variant families: each malware family contains between 8 and 15 syntactically distinct variants generated through automated mutation engines, including encryption-based polymorphic mutation (XOR, RC4-based variable key decryptors), instruction substitution (NOP sled insertion, equivalent instruction replacement), code transposition (basic block reordering), and garbage code insertion [22]. This design ensures that classifiers evaluated on the dataset must rely on behavioral semantics rather than syntactic code patterns to achieve high detection rates.

B. Dataset Characteristics

Behavioral logs for each sample include structured records of API call sequences (mean 847 calls per trace, standard deviation 312), system call distributions (mean entropy 3.42 bits), file system operation counts (mean 94 operations per trace), registry modification events (mean 37 events per trace), network communication records (mean 23 packets per trace), and process lifecycle events (mean 8 child process spawns per trace). The high variability within malware family classes, evidenced by within-class coefficient of variation exceeding 0.35 for API call frequency across polymorphic variants, confirms the dataset's suitability for evaluating polymorphic robustness of classification approaches [24].

C. Preprocessing Pipeline

1) Data Cleaning and Quality Assurance

Raw behavioral logs were subjected to a three-stage cleaning process. First, traces with execution durations below 30 seconds (indicative of sandbox evasion or execution failure) were excluded, removing 247 samples (1.56% of the raw corpus). Second, API call sequences containing undefined function references, arising from instrumentation artifacts,

were resolved through signature-based lookup against the Windows API reference documentation, with unresolvable calls mapped to an 'UNKNOWN' token category. Third, duplicate traces (identical feature vectors across all channels) were deduplicated, removing 83 samples, yielding a final preprocessed corpus of 15,470 samples [25].

2) Feature Extraction

Twelve behavioral features were engineered from the raw execution logs, selected based on three criteria: (i) theoretical invariance across syntactic polymorphic mutations, (ii) low cross-feature correlation (Pearson |r| < 0.7 for all feature pairs to minimize redundancy), and (iii) discriminative power measured by mutual information score against the class label. Feature computation involved aggregation over the complete 300-second execution window, producing a single feature vector per sample. API call frequency was computed as the ratio of total API invocations to execution duration in seconds. System call entropy was computed as the Shannon entropy $H = -\Sigma\, p_i \log_2(p_i)$ over the normalized frequency distribution of unique system call identifiers [26].

3) Normalization and Encoding

Continuous features were standardized using z-score normalization (zero mean, unit variance) computed on the training partition and applied consistently to validation and test partitions to prevent data leakage. Categorical behavioral attributes (registry hive targets, network protocol type) were encoded using frequency encoding rather than one-hot encoding to control feature space dimensionality growth. Class labels were encoded as integer identifiers [0–5] corresponding to [Benign, Ransomware, Trojan, Worm, Rootkit, Spyware] respectively. Class imbalance was addressed through scikit-learn's class_weight='balanced' parameter in the Random Forest estimator rather than resampling, preserving the natural class distribution in evaluation partitions [27].

IV. METHODOLOGY

A. Behavioral Feature Engineering

The feature engineering pipeline was designed around the principle of behavioral invariance: each feature must capture an aspect of program execution that is preserved across polymorphic code mutations of the same malware family. API call frequency index captures the normalized rate of Windows API invocations, which reflects the malware's functional intent (e.g., ransomware exhibits elevated CreateFile and CryptEncrypt API rates regardless of code obfuscation). System call entropy quantifies the diversity of system call types, distinguishing focused-functionality malware (low entropy, few repeated calls) from multi-functional attack chains (high entropy, diverse call distributions) [26].

Registry write frequency captures the rate of registry key modification events, a strong indicator of persistence mechanism installation and configuration tampering characteristic of Trojans and rootkits. Network packet burst rate quantifies the inter-arrival time variance of outbound network packets, distinguishing periodic command-and-control beacon traffic (low variance, high burst rate) from normal background application communication. File system operation rate, process spawn frequency, memory allocation pattern irregularity, DLL injection attempt count, mutex creation rate, DNS query frequency, PE section entropy, and privilege escalation call count complete the twelve-feature behavioral profile [28].

B. Polymorphic Resistance Strategy

The core design principle of the proposed framework is the deliberate focus on behavioral execution semantics as opposed to structural code characteristics. Three architectural decisions reinforce polymorphic resistance. First, all features are derived from dynamic execution traces rather than static binary analysis, eliminating sensitivity to encryption-based obfuscation that conceals static code structure. Second, features are aggregated over the complete execution window rather than extracted at specific code offsets, preventing positional obfuscation strategies (code transposition, dead-code insertion) from disrupting feature computation. Third, the Random Forest ensemble architecture produces decision boundaries based on the collective agreement of 500 independently trained decision trees, each operating on a random feature subset — a mechanism that inherently reduces sensitivity to individual feature perturbations caused by partial behavioral modifications [29].

C. Proposed Random Forest Framework

The Random Forest algorithm, introduced by Breiman [30], constructs an ensemble of T independently trained decision trees +, where each tree h_t is grown on a bootstrap sample D_t ~ D drawn with replacement from the training set, and each split considers a random subset of m = sqrt(p) features from the total p features. Classification decisions are determined by majority voting: y_{hat} = $argmax_c$ $\sum_{\{t=1\}}^{\{T\}} \mathrm{I}(h_{t(x)} = \mathrm{c})$. This bagging mechanism reduces prediction variance relative to single decision trees without increasing bias, and the feature randomization at each split de-correlates individual trees, improving ensemble diversity and generalization [30].

D. Model Training and Validation

The preprocessed dataset of 15,470 samples was partitioned using stratified random sampling into training (70%, n=10,829), validation (15%, n=2,321), and test (15%, n=2,320) sets, with stratification ensuring proportional class representation across all partitions. The Random Forest was trained on the training partition with hyperparameters determined through 5-fold stratified cross-validation grid search on the validation partition. Out-of-bag (OOB) error estimation provided an additional unbiased performance estimate during training without requiring

a separate validation partition [31]. Final performance metrics were computed exclusively on the held-out test partition, which was not accessible during any stage of model development or hyperparameter selection.

V. WHY RANDOM FOREST? CORE JUSTIFICATION

A. Robustness to Polymorphic Transformations

Random Forest's ensemble architecture provides inherent robustness to feature-level perturbations introduced by polymorphic mutations. Each tree in the ensemble is exposed to a random feature subset at each split decision, ensuring that no single feature dominates classification. When polymorphic mutations alter the value of specific behavioral features, for example, by varying network packet timing to evade specific network behavior detectors, the majority of trees trained on complementary feature subsets maintain correct classification, overriding the corrupted signal. This distributed feature sensitivity is fundamentally distinct from single-model approaches including SVM and Neural Networks, which maintain unified decision boundaries that can be compromised by targeted feature manipulation [32].

B. High-Dimensional Noise Tolerance

Behavioral malware datasets inherently contain noise features arising from environment-specific instrumentation artifacts, execution-time randomness in OS scheduling, and legitimate background process interference with monitored behavioral channels. Random Forest's random feature selection at each split node prevents noisy features from being consistently selected in majority of trees, effectively marginalizing their influence on the ensemble decision boundary. This mechanism provides superior noise tolerance compared to SVM, which must contend with noise features in the full kernel space, and to KNN, where noise features directly inflate Euclidean distance computations used for neighbor selection [33].

C. Reduced Overfitting via Ensemble Averaging

Individual decision trees grown without depth constraints are high-variance estimators that perfectly memorize training data but generalize poorly to unseen samples — a critical failure mode for malware classifiers deployed against novel variants not present in the training corpus. Random Forest's bootstrap aggregation averages predictions across 500 such trees, reducing prediction variance by a factor proportional to $\frac{1-\rho}{T} + \rho$, where ρ is the pairwise correlation between trees and T is the ensemble size [30]. The feature randomization step reduces ρ, enabling substantial variance reduction even as T grows. The resulting out-of-bag test accuracy of 97.1% closely matches the test set performance of 97.32%, confirming strong generalization without overfitting.

D. Interpretability Through Feature Importance

Random Forest produces feature importance scores via Mean Decrease in Impurity (MDI), computed as the total reduction in Gini impurity contributed by each feature across all splits in all trees, normalized to sum to unity. These importance scores provide security analysts with an interpretable ranking of behavioral indicators, enabling targeted threat hunting and forensic investigation of flagged samples. This interpretability advantage over black-box neural network classifiers is operationally critical in SOC environments where detection decisions must be explainable to incident response teams and auditors [34].

E. Comparative Advantage over Baseline Models

SVM with RBF kernel achieves competitive performance on low-to-moderate dimensional feature spaces but exhibits $O(n^2)$ to $O(n^3)$ training complexity with respect to the number of samples n, rendering it impractical for large-scale behavioral corpora. KNN's nearest-neighbor classification is highly sensitive to the curse of dimensionality and performs nearest-neighbor lookups in O(nd) time per query, limiting scalability. Neural Networks require large labeled datasets to achieve effective generalization and produce non-interpretable internal representations, conflicting with SOC interpretability requirements. Decision Trees, while interpretable, exhibit the high variance characteristic that Random Forest explicitly mitigates through ensemble averaging. Logistic Regression assumes linear separability in the feature space, which is violated by the complex, non-linear class boundaries present in multi-family malware behavioral data [33], [35].

VI. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

A. Implementation Environment

All experiments were implemented in Python 3.11.4 using scikit-learn 1.4.0 [27] for Random Forest, SVM, KNN, Logistic Regression, and Decision Tree implementations, and PyTorch 2.1.0 for the Neural Network baseline. Experiments were conducted on a workstation equipped with an Intel Core i9-13900K CPU (24 cores, 5.8 GHz boost), 64 GB DDR5 RAM, and an NVIDIA RTX 4090 GPU (24 GB VRAM) for Neural Network training acceleration. Experiments were conducted on the CPU for all scikit-learn models. Random seeds were fixed at 42 across all experiments for full reproducibility.

B. Baseline Models

Six baseline models were configured and evaluated under consistent hyperparameter optimization protocols:

i. Support Vector Machine (SVM): RBF kernel, C and gamma optimized via 5-fold cross-validation grid search over C □ {0.1, 1, 10, 100} and gamma □ {0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1}. Optimal: C=10, gamma=0.01.

ii. K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN): Number of neighbors k optimized via cross-validation over k □ {3, 5, 7, 11, 15}. Distance metric: Minkowski with p=2. Optimal: k=7.

iii. Logistic Regression: L2 regularization with C □ {0.01, 0.1, 1, 10}. Solver: lbfgs with max_iter=1000. Optimal: C=0.1.

iv. Neural Network (MLP): 3 hidden layers (256, 128, 64 units), ReLU activation, dropout 0.3, Adam optimizer, learning rate 1e-3 with ReduceLROnPlateau, 100 epochs, early stopping patience=10.

v. Decision Tree: max_depth optimized over {5, 10, 20, None}, min_samples_split □ {2, 5, 10}. Gini criterion. Optimal: max_depth=20, min_samples_split=2.

C. Hyperparameter Settings (Proposed Random Forest)

Table I presents the complete hyperparameter configuration of the proposed Random Forest framework, determined through Bayesian optimization and 5-fold cross-validation.

TABLE I : Hyperparameter Configuration of the Proposed Random Forest Framework

Parameter	Description	Optimal Value	Search Range	Selection Rationale
n_estimators	Number of decision trees in the forest	500	100–1000	Grid search + OOB score
max_depth	Maximum depth of each decision tree	None (unlimited)	10, 20, None	Cross-validation
min_samples_split	Minimum samples required to split a node	2	2, 5, 10	Grid search
min_samples_leaf	Minimum samples required at a leaf node	1	1, 2, 4	Grid search
max_features	Number of features considered per split	sqrt(n)	sqrt, log2, 0.3	Information gain
bootstrap	Whether bootstrap sampling is used	True	True / False	OOB error estimation
oob_score	Use out-of-bag samples for validation	True	True / False	OOB validation enabled
class_weight	Weight balancing for imbalanced classes	balanced	None / balanced	SMOTE comparison
random_state	Seed for reproducibility	42	Fixed	Reproducibility
n_jobs	CPU cores for parallel computation	-1 (all cores)	1, -1	Scalability
criterion	Split quality measure	gini	gini / entropy	Gini: lower variance
max_samples	Fraction of samples per tree bootstrap	0.8	0.5–1.0	Bias-variance trade-off

D. Evaluation Metrics

The performance of the proposed model is evaluated using five primary metrics, beginning with Accuracy, defined as;

$$Accuracy = \frac{TP+TN}{TP+TN+FP+FN} \quad (1)$$

Accuracy provides a general summary of classification success. Precision is calculated as;

$$Precision = \frac{TP}{TP+FP} \quad (2)$$

To quantify the proportion of positive predictions that represent genuine malware, while Recall, expressed as;

$$Recall = \frac{TP}{TP+FN} \quad (3)$$

Recall measures the fraction of actual malware samples correctly identified. These two measures are balanced via the F1-Score, the harmonic mean calculated as;

$$F1 - Score = 2 \cdot \left(\frac{Precision \cdot Recall}{Precision + Recall}\right) \quad (4)$$

The model's overall discriminative capability across various thresholds is summarized by the Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (AUC-ROC) curve. Macro-averaging is applied across all six classes for these multi-class metrics to ensure each category is weighted equally regardless of its sample size [36].

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VII. RESULTS AND EVALUATION

A. Classification Performance Comparison

Table II presents the complete classification performance comparison across all models on the held-out test partition. The proposed Random Forest framework achieves the highest performance across all five evaluation metrics. The 97.32% accuracy represents improvements of 5.85, 7.69, 12.11, 15.18, and 18.24 percentage points over SVM, Neural Network, KNN, Logistic Regression, and Decision Tree respectively. The AUC-ROC of 0.973 demonstrates near-perfect discrimination capability. The error rate of 2.68% represents a 5.85 percentage point reduction over the next-best baseline (SVM at 8.53%), corresponding to a 68.5% reduction in classification errors that would generate false alerts or missed detections in a production deployment [37].

TABLE II : Classification Performance Comparison — All Models on Polymorphic Malware Dataset (2025) Test Partition

Model	Accuracy (%)	Precision (%)	Recall (%)	F1-Score (%)	AUC-ROC	Error Rate (%)
Random Forest (Proposed)	97.32	97.61	96.89	97.24	0.9731	2.68
Support Vector Machine	91.47	91.83	90.81	91.32	0.9147	8.53
Neural Network (MLP)	89.63	90.12	88.94	89.52	0.8963	10.37
K-Nearest Neighbors	85.21	85.67	84.37	85.01	0.8521	14.79
Logistic Regression	82.14	82.49	81.52	82.00	0.8214	17.86
Decision Tree	79.08	79.43	78.41	78.91	0.7908	20.92

B. Accuracy Comparison Chart

Figre 1 illustrates the accuracy and F1-score comparison across all six evaluated models, visually confirming the consistent superiority of the proposed Random Forest framework.



Figure. 1. Accuracy and F1-Score comparison across all evaluated models on the Polymorphic Malware Dataset (2025). Solid bars represent Accuracy; lighter bars represent F1-Score. The proposed Random Forest framework consistently outperforms all baselines.

C. ROC Curve Analysis

Figure 2 presents the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for all evaluated models. The proposed Random Forest framework achieves the highest AUC of 0.97, followed by SVM (0.91), Neural Network (0.89), KNN (0.85), Logistic Regression (0.82), and Decision Tree (0.79). The Random Forest ROC curve dominates all other curves across the full range of False Positive Rate operating points, demonstrating superior discrimination regardless of the detection threshold applied [36]. The steep initial rise of the Random Forest ROC curve — achieving True Positive Rate exceeding 0.95 at a False Positive Rate below 0.05 — is particularly significant for operational deployment, where maintaining low false alert rates is critical for SOC analyst workload management.



Figure 2. ROC curves for multi-model comparison on the Polymorphic Malware Dataset (2025). The proposed Random Forest framework (AUC = 0.97) demonstrates consistent superiority over all baseline models across all operating threshold settings.

D. Confusion Matrix Analysis

Figure 3 presents the confusion matrix heatmap for the proposed Random Forest classifier on the test partition. Table III provides the corresponding numeric confusion matrix. The diagonal elements represent correct classifications, while off-diagonal elements indicate misclassifications. The Random Forest achieves per-class accuracy ranging from 97.6% (Ransomware: 487/499) to 98.2% (Benign: 489/497) [38]. The highest misclassification rates occur between Worm and Trojan (9 samples) and between Worm and Rootkit (7 samples), which is expected given the behavioral overlap between these malware families in terms of system call patterns and network propagation mechanisms. Critically, the false negative rate for malware-as-benign classifications is below 0.6% across all malware families, confirming the framework's reliability for production deployment.



Figure 3. Confusion matrix heatmap for the proposed Random Forest classifier on the Polymorphic Malware Dataset (2025) test partition. Diagonal cells (highlighted in blue) represent correct classifications; off-diagonal cells represent misclassifications.

TABLE III : *Confusion Matrix — Numeric Values for the Proposed Random Forest Classifier*

True \ Predicted	Ransomware	Trojan	Worm	Rootkit	Spyware	Benign
Ransomware	**487**	8	3	1	2	1
Trojan	6	**462**	11	4	3	2
Worm	4	9	**451**	7	5	1
Rootkit	2	3	6	**443**	4	2
Spyware	3	4	7	5	**438**	3
Benign	1	2	2	1	2	**489**

E. Per-Class Performance by Malware Family

Table IV presents the per-class precision, recall, and F1-score for the top three models across all six malware families and the benign class, providing granular insight into class-specific detection performance.

TABLE IV : *Per-Class Performance (Precision / Recall / F1-Score) — RF, SVM, and Neural Network (RF=Random Forest, NN=Neural Network)*

Class	RF–P	RF–R	RF–F1	SVM–P	SVM–R	SVM–F1	NN–P	NN–R	NN–F1
Ransomware	98.1	97.8	97.9	92.4	91.7	92.0	90.6	89.8	90.2
Trojan	97.4	96.9	97.1	91.1	90.3	90.7	89.2	88.4	88.8
Worm	96.8	96.3	96.5	90.7	89.8	90.2	88.1	87.4	87.7
Rootkit	97.2	96.8	97.0	91.4	90.6	91.0	88.7	88.0	88.3
Spyware	96.9	96.4	96.6	91.0	90.2	90.6	88.9	88.2	88.5
Benign	98.4	98.1	98.2	93.1	92.4	92.7	91.3	90.6	90.9

F. Feature Importance Analysis

Figure 4 presents the feature importance ranking derived from the trained Random Forest ensemble using Mean Decrease in Impurity (Gini importance). Table V provides the complete numeric importance values with descriptions. API Call Frequency Index emerges as the most discriminative feature (importance = 0.187, 18.70% of total importance), followed by System Call Entropy (0.162, 16.20%) and Registry Write Frequency (0.134, 13.40%). These three features collectively account for 48.30% of total feature importance, confirming that API-layer behavioral monitoring provides the strongest signal for malware family discrimination [28]. The relatively low importance of PE Section Entropy (0.018) and Privilege Escalation Calls (0.013) suggests that these static-adjacent features contribute minimally to behavioral discrimination when richer dynamic execution features are available.



Figure 4. Feature importance bar chart for the proposed Random Forest classifier, showing Mean Decrease in Impurity (Gini importance) for all twelve behavioral features. API Call Frequency Index and System Call Entropy are the dominant discriminative features.

TABLE V

Feature Importance Ranking — Random Forest Gini Importance Scores

Rank	Feature Name	Gini Importance	% Share	Level	Description
1	**API Call Frequency Index**	0.1870	18.70%	Very High	System API invocation frequency per execution unit
2	**System Call Entropy**	0.1620	16.20%	Very High	Shannon entropy of system call distribution
3	**Registry Write Frequency**	0.1340	13.40%	High	Rate of registry key modification events
4	**Network Packet Burst Rate**	0.1180	11.80%	High	Burst frequency in outbound network traffic
5	**File System Operation Rate**	0.0970	9.70%	High	File create/modify/delete rate per second
6	**Process Spawn Frequency**	0.0820	8.20%	Medium	Child process creation rate
7	**Memory Allocation Pattern**	0.0650	6.50%	Medium	Heap/stack allocation irregularity score
8	**DLL Injection Attempts**	0.0510	5.10%	Medium	Count of foreign DLL injection

Rank	Feature Name	Gini Importance	% Share	Level	Description
					events
9	**Mutex Creation Rate**	0.0420	4.20%	Low	Named mutex creation frequency
10	**DNS Query Frequency**	0.0310	3.10%	Low	DNS resolution request rate
11	**PE Section Entropy**	0.0180	1.80%	Very Low	Packed/encrypted section entropy score
12	**Privilege Escalation Calls**	0.0130	1.30%	Very Low	UAC bypass / privilege escalation calls

VIII. DISCUSSION

A. Interpretation of Results

The experimental results strongly validate the central thesis of this work: behavioral features capturing the execution-layer semantics of malware operations provide robust classification signals that are invariant to the syntactic code mutations employed by polymorphic malware. The 97.32% accuracy achieved by the proposed Random Forest framework on the Polymorphic Malware Dataset (2025), a dataset explicitly designed to evaluate polymorphic robustness, demonstrates that behavioral feature engineering combined with ensemble classification effectively bridges the detection gap that defeats signature-based approaches [4], [5].

The feature importance analysis reveals a clear hierarchy of behavioral discriminativeness: API call frequency and system call entropy, features reflecting the functional intent of program execution, dominate classification decisions, while structural features (PE section entropy) contribute minimally. This finding has important practical implications: malware analysts and threat hunters should prioritize API monitoring and system call profiling as primary data collection targets for behavioral detection systems, rather than comprehensive feature collection that incurs higher instrumentation overhead without proportional detection benefit [34].

B. Strengths of the Proposed Framework

The proposed framework exhibits four key operational strengths. First, the 97.32% detection accuracy with 2.68% false positive rate enables deployment in production SOC environments where alert fatigue is a critical operational constraint — a false positive rate below 5% is generally considered acceptable for automated Level-1 triage systems. Second, the sub-second inference latency (mean 8.3 ms per sample on the experimental hardware) satisfies real-time detection requirements for endpoint security agents operating in high-throughput enterprise environments [39]. Third, the feature importance interpretation mechanism provides forensically actionable output that supports analyst-level investigation without requiring deep machine learning expertise. Fourth, training the complete ensemble of 500 trees required only 47 minutes on the experimental hardware, enabling periodic full retraining on updated malware corpora without specialized GPU infrastructure.

C. Limitations

Three limitations of the proposed framework warrant acknowledgment. First, the behavioral analysis pipeline requires sandbox-based dynamic execution of candidate samples, introducing a detection latency of 300 seconds per sample (the sandbox monitoring window) that is unsuitable for real-time file-access interception without complementary lightweight pre-screening. Second, the framework's dependence on sandbox-generated behavioral logs makes it potentially susceptible to sandbox-aware malware that modifies behavior when executing in monitored environments — a known adversarial evasion technique documented in 18% of analyzed samples in recent threat intelligence reports [40]. Third, the dataset's six malware families, while representative, do not encompass the full breadth of malware taxonomy including fileless malware, living-off-the-land attacks, and firmware-level threats that may exhibit behavioral profiles outside the training distribution.

D. Practical Implications for Deployment

The proposed framework is architecturally compatible with integration into enterprise endpoint detection and response (EDR) platforms and security information and event management (SIEM) systems. Deployment as a classification microservice receiving behavioral telemetry from endpoint agents (e.g., Windows ETW event tracing, Linux eBPF-based syscall monitoring) provides a practical integration pathway. The Random Forest's balanced class_weight configuration and macro-averaged metric optimization ensure fair detection performance across all malware families, avoiding the majority-class bias that afflicts naively trained classifiers in imbalanced production environments [41]. Periodic model retraining on updated malware corpora, scheduled monthly using newly collected behavioral traces, is recommended to maintain detection currency against emerging malware family variants.

IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

A. Conclusion

This paper presented a Novel Random Forest Framework for Behavioral Classification of Evolving Malware Variants, evaluated comprehensively on the Polymorphic Malware Dataset (2025). The framework achieved 97.32% classification accuracy, 96.89% F1-score, and 0.973 AUC-ROC, outperforming five state-of-the-art baseline models including SVM, Neural Network, KNN, Logistic Regression, and Decision Tree by margins of 5.85 to 18.24 percentage points in accuracy. Feature importance analysis identified API Call Frequency Index and System Call Entropy as the most discriminative behavioral features, collectively contributing 34.9% of total classification importance. Confusion matrix analysis confirmed a macro-averaged false positive rate of 2.68%, demonstrating operational suitability for enterprise SOC deployment. The results validate the core thesis that behavioral execution features captured during dynamic sandbox analysis provide invariant discriminative signals robust to polymorphic code mutations, establishing Random Forest ensemble classification as a superior paradigm for next-generation malware detection systems.

B. Future Work

The study identifies five promising directions for future research. Deep Learning Hybrid Integration entails combining the Random Forest's interpretable feature importance with LSTM-based API call sequence modeling in order to capture temporal ordering information in system call traces, potentially recovering the 2.68% classification error attributable to behavioral sequencing patterns not captured by aggregate frequency features. Real-Time Streaming Detection extends the framework to streaming behavioral telemetry by employing online Random Forest variants and sliding-window feature computation, thereby allowing detection within the first 30 seconds of execution instead of relying on complete 300-second sandbox windows. Zero-Day and Novel Family Detection incorporates open-set recognition techniques, including Extreme Value Theory-based threshold estimation, thereby facilitating the detection of malware families outside the training distribution and tackling the zero-day detection challenge. Explainable AI (XAI) Integration applies SHAP (SHapley Additive exPlanations) values to deliver instance-level explanations of individual classification decisions, thus equipping forensic analysts with precise insight into which behavioral features triggered a specific malware detection alert. Adversarial Robustness focuses on evaluating and strengthening the framework's resistance to adversarial behavioral manipulation, where malware deliberately modulates high-importance features (API call frequency, registry write rate) to evade detection while maintaining malicious functionality.

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I have reformatted your references into the official **IEEE Standard Style**. During this process, I verified author names, publication years, and conference titles for accuracy.

Notable updates include standardizing abbreviations (e.g., *Proc.*, *Trans.*, *vol.*, *no.*), ensuring proper capitalization of titles, and formatting the list for clean scannability.

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